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The onslaught of COVID-19 in March 2020 claimed the lives of millions and caused a global 
economic downturn marked by vast unemployment. Previous research has focused on how fiscal 
policy is utilized by advanced developed nations and their objectives with respect to fiscal 
policy. This paper aims to examine how a given nation’s labor market spending policies are 
impacted by its political economic structure. In order to delineate between and analyze the 
approaches of different political economic structures, this paper utilizes Nordic, Liberal, and 
Asian States constructs. In order to investigate the impact of political economic structure on 
labor market spending, explanatory variables, including GDP growth rate, the unemployment 
rate, top marginal individual income tax rates, the GINI index, a democracy index, and COVID-
19 confirmed cases, will be utilized in a regression analysis to examine the effects on the 
unemployment benefits replacement rate. A nation’s top marginal individual income tax rate is 
found to have a significant positive effect on a nation’s unemployment benefits replacement rate. 
And of the three constructs (Nordic, Liberal, and Asian states), Liberal is the only significant 
result, and had a strong negative correlation with a nation’s unemployment benefits replacement 
rate. Moving forward, this has broad implications for Liberal states. Particularly in the U.S., the 
COVID-19 pandemic has exposed disparities in the labor market for low-income workers. This 
may prove to be a turning point as policy makers accede to demands for more support to workers 
in the form of enhanced unemployment benefits. 
Background 
Notable scientific accomplishments in the 20th and early 21st century have inevitably 
encouraged a sense of human mastery, reinforcing the illusion that no problem can withstand our 
technological prowess. In tandem, many developed nations experienced steady growth in 
economic prosperity and strengthening labor markets that vaulted them over the 2008 recession 
and brought unprecedented prosperity leading up to the start of 2020. Fast forward to March 
2020 and the onslaught of COVID-19, which brought the international community to its knees 
and threatened the lives of millions, humbling a global economy unprepared for a world-wide 
pandemic. COVID-19 has killed millions of people and disrupted markets, economies, and the 
entire social fabric of nations globally. In the U.S, the S&P 500 index dropped 12 percent in the 
final two weeks of February 2020, obliterating roughly $3 trillion in wealth (Enrich et. al, 2020). 
Nearly $8.5 trillion in projected global output from 2020-2022 is expected to be lost, effectively 
undoing the economic gains for the previous four years. Lockdowns have led to the disruption of 
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supply chains, increased unemployment rates, and lowered consumer demand. The pandemic 
could fundamentally change interdependence, trade, and globalization, while accelerating 
digitalization and automation; both of which will further impact the labor force.  
While COVID-19’s effects on the labor force have been swift, many countries have 
implemented fiscal stimulus measures (some estimated to be as high as 10 percent of GDP) to 
minimize the impact of job loss. (UN World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2020). This, 
however, is by no means the standard, as developing economies have struggled to implement 
large fiscal packages, averaging less than 1% of GDP (UN World Economic Situation and 
Prospects, 2020). What is clear is the devastating impact of COVID-19 on the global workforce, 
specifically unemployment, which has an outsized effect on the world economy. In 2020, 8.8 
percent of global working hours were lost relative to the fourth quarter of 2019, equivalent to 
255 million full-time jobs (UN World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2020).  
The speed of global recovery hinges on a timely and coordinated response. Governments 
were forced to act quickly to confront COVID-19 in order to offset rising unemployment rates 
and economic downturn. Not surprisingly, the global response has been neither timely nor 
coordinated. This provides an opportunity to evaluate how the varied international response to 
COVID-19 has impacted more developed nations’ labor markets. This study will use a nation’s 
commitment to unemployment benefits as a leading indicator of how it sought to mitigate the 
COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on its economy.  
With the focus on more developed nations, this paper will further zero in on varying 
degrees of the Welfare State. The Welfare State theory documents the differences in how the 
governments of more developed countries spend to support citizens. The Welfare state is defined 
as a principal institution of post-war capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This includes the 
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institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape current social policy 
decisions and expenditure developments (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Welfare states differ 
qualitatively between nations due to differences in historical institutionalization impacting the 
approach to short term policies, reforms, debate, and decision-making (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The policies of a welfare state focus on social expenditures, and can include goals to maximize 
labor force participation, redistribute income, and implement expansionary fiscal policy. A 
nation’s place on the spectrum of welfare policies is not static. In times of crisis brought on by 
events like COVID-19, there is the potential for a nation’s idea of the welfare state to evolve. 
The tumultuous election year that American voters experienced on top of the economic and 
social losses incurred by COVID-19 almost guarantees that some heretofore politically untenable 
stimulus measures may be here to stay. In March 2021, the Senate Finance Committee 
introduced legislation that would finance six months of wages and support services for eligible 
unemployed workers (U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 2021).  
It is important to look at the broader implications of these stimulus decisions. This paper 
will investigate the linkage between political economic structure and social spending. I 
hypothesize that richer, more democratic nations will spend more on unemployment benefits, 
which, in the case of COVID-19, helped mitigate the economic downturn and hastened a nation’s 
recovery. The disparities which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic have revealed 
vast differences in government spending. While it seems only logical that richer, more 
democratic states will spend more on unemployment benefits and the broader labor market, it 
appears that other factors, like political ideology, may be at play. This raises my central question: 
how does a nation’s political economic structure impact the level of support it is willing to invest 
in unemployment benefits?  
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This paper utilizes three welfare state constructs: Nordic (social democratic), liberal, and 
Asian states. The Nordic construct includes Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. 
The liberal construct: Switzerland, the UK, Ireland, the U.S., and Canada. Finally, the Asian 
States construct encompasses South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Each 
welfare state construct in this paper has a different approach to welfare and unemployment 
benefits. 
The Nordic construct has a track record of success in combining economic efficiency 
with a stable labor market. The Nordic construct is characterized by high taxes, significant 
amounts of income redistribution, and a high level of confidence and trust in the state (Andersen 
et. al, 2007). However, the long-term sustainability of Nordic policies has been questioned by 
critics, as globalization and changing demographics of its aging populations will undoubtedly 
affect the labor market and any attempts at reform (Andersen et. al, 2007).  
The Liberal construct emphasizes individualism, a departure from the cultural values 
associated with Nordic countries (Spicker, 2013). Generally, the liberal state is market-oriented, 
with a lower level of expenditure on social protection and a higher level of income inequality 
when compared to the Nordic construct (Spicker, 2013). 
Rounding out the study, the Asian states construct is characterized by an emerging 
welfare state. There is a complementary emphasis on welfare programs for economic 
development, and an inclination towards health and education over social security (Park & Jung, 
2007). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, each of these constructs will be particularly 
interesting to examine, as the impact on each approach has been varied. By analyzing each 
construct, this paper will seek to measure how well equipped each political economic structure 
was to handle the supply-shock brought on by COVID-19. First, I examine previous literature on 
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labor market spending to anticipate which political economic structures will be best equipped to 
handle COVID-19. Then I present the theory behind this paper’s regression analysis, which is 
followed by results and conclusions.  
Literature Review 
This section outlines relevant research that investigates the impact of COVID-19 and 
previous crises on labor markets. Of particular interest are studies of how fiscal policy is utilized 
by advanced developed nations within the construct (Nordic, Liberal and Asian States) and the 
objectives they aim to accomplish with fiscal policy. Also included, for comparison purposes, are 
nations with different political economic structures and the objectives they seek to accomplish 
through fiscal policy. Although the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has not been seen since the 
Influenza Pandemic of 1918, useful and more recent data can be gleaned from the Great 
Recession and other policy responses to public health crises including SARS, the Swine Flu, and 
Ebola. 
Nordic, Liberal, and Asian States Use of ALMPs to address unemployment 
To address how and why different political economic structures vary in how they allocate 
funding, a paper by Nelson (2012) examined how welfare state regimes spend in order to 
accomplish their policy objectives. Nelson (2012) introduces the term active labor market 
policies (ALMPs), consisting of a diverse set of tools that policymakers use to address 
joblessness. Each nation can tailor these ALMPs to their unique conditions and calibrate them to 
handle an increase in unemployment differently. Nelson (2012) also acknowledges that 
partisanship, welfare state regimes, and political economic structure majorly impact spending 
patterns as well. Not surprisingly, she concluded that partisanship explained differences in fund 
allocation for direct job creation, training, labor market services, and employment incentives. 
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Nelson (2012) finds that the Nordic construct tends to spend more on direct job creation than 
either the Liberal or Asian State constructs. But generally, Nelson (2012) also finds that every 
country, regardless of their political economic structure, relies on policies that support labor 
market services (Nelson, 2012). An article by Pontusson & Raess (2012) also examined the role 
of partisanship, and ultimately acknowledged that while this difference in crisis response could 
be partially attributed to partisanship divide within governments, it cannot fully explain this shift 
(p.28).  
In order to better understand how fiscal policy is used by different political economic 
structures to accomplish desired outcomes, Pontusson & Raess (2012) analyzed the responses of 
Western European countries and the U.S. to the Great Recession of 2008 and the recession that 
spanned the 1970s/80s. The main objective of the article was to examine and rationalize the shift 
in response to crises in the last 50 years by looking at metrics including GDP growth, 
unemployment rates, union density, and fiscal stimulus (Pontusson & Raess, 2012, p.14). This 
data confirmed that discretionary fiscal policy measures in response to the Great Recession were 
more expansionary in the United States (Liberal construct) when compared to Western European 
countries, with Sweden’s discretionary stimulus (Nordic construct) being the smallest (Pontusson 
& Raess, 2012, p.19). But overall, each of the sampled nations used monetary easing during the 
Great Recession to address unemployment.  
To address this difference in response despite partisan and electoral pressure, Pontusson 
& Raess (2012) asked why European governments have not opted to boost compensation for the 
unemployed or to improve employment protection in recent recessions. They claimed that this 
could be attributed, in part, to the recent decline in the political-economic clout of organized 
labor (Pontusson & Raess, 2012, p.29).  
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Another reason that responses varied in the Great Recession from previous recessions is 
that inflationary pressures were slightly less in 2008 compared to the 1970s/80s. This will prove 
to be a critical part of the COVID-19 pandemic response, as higher inflation in some nations may 
limit their ability to apply expansionary measures. While Nordic, Liberal, and Asian State 
countries can reject or temper a Keynesian response to recession and unemployment, Pontusson 
& Raess (2012) argue that Keynesianism did not end with the recession of the 1970s/80s but can 
now be divided into liberal and social branches. Social Keynesianism utilizes public spending 
and redistributive measures to sustain long-term prosperity, while liberal Keynesianism focuses 
on spurring demand during economic downturns. Liberal Keynesianism, where governments 
utilize tax cuts over spending increases, is now the standard response for economic crises 
whether in Nordic, Liberal, or Asian state nations (Pontusson & Raess, 2012, p.31).  
Bearing this in mind, it will be interesting to see if this holds true for the countries 
sampled in this research. These conclusions drawn from Pontusson & Raess’ (2012) demonstrate 
some of the differences in spending choices between Liberal and Nordic constructs. It can be 
posited that a Nordic nation like Sweden already had sufficient support in place for workers 
affected by the economic downturn, whereas Liberal economies oftentimes need to supplement 
with stimulus measures.  
Given this, it is anticipated that the Nordic construct will include a high level of support 
for the labor market and has such been referred to as a blueprint for other countries. A paper by 
Forslund & Krueger (1997) discussed a Nordic state’s, Sweden, successful approach to labor 
market spending. Sweden has utilized ALMPs, including extensive job training, public sector 
relief work, recruitment subsidies, youth programs, mobility bonuses, and unemployment 
benefits, to offset any adverse effects of unemployment and expand employment. Forslund & 
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Krueger (1997) stated that the duration of Sweden’s unemployment benefits was twice the 
maximum allowed by the U.S. (a liberal nation), not including the extension period that can be 
granted to workers who participate in public relief jobs or attend retraining (p. 295). While 
Pontusson & Raess (2012) included Sweden in their study, Forslund & Krueger (1997) 
concentrated on the effectiveness of Sweden’s ALMP’s over time, especially given Sweden’s 
success in weathering the adverse oil price shocks of the 1970s/80s. Even so, this confidence in 
the Nordic construct must be scrutinized, as Forslund & Krueger published their findings in 
1997, well after unemployment in Sweden began trending upward beginning in 1991. According 
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate in Sweden reached 9.5 percent in 
July 1993, which exceeded the U.S.’ rate at the time, 6.8 percent (Forslund & Krueger, 1997, p. 
267). It’s fair to question the effectiveness of Nordic ALMP’s in lowering unemployment rates, 
as well as whether widespread application of this construct is practical. 
Alternatives to ALMPs for Nordic, Liberal and Asian States Nations 
If these ALMPs are not as effective as one may anticipate, then what alternatives are 
preferred? This is critical, as the COVID-19 pandemic has affected labor markets worldwide, 
and it is presently unknown how far-reaching these conditions will be. Forslund & Krueger 
(1997) suggest that Sweden’s (and subsequently, other Nordic nations) potential shortcoming 
may be a lack of encouragement for entrepreneurial activity by unemployed workers. This could 
be in the form of training in business activities, a tax exemption for startups for a set period of 
time, or other programs. In the U.S., the practice of providing unemployment benefits in a lump 
sum to individuals who are interested in receiving seed capital to start a business has seen some 
success (Forslund & Krueger, 1997, p. 296). This could prove to be especially helpful in Nordic 
nations, which tend to have high marginal tax rates that discourage entrepreneurial ventures 
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(Forslund & Krueger, 1997, p. 296). Ultimately, Forslund & Krueger (1997) concluded that there 
is little evidence to indicate that these expenditures have done much to improve productivity in 
Sweden.  
In the case of COVID-19, these findings can be applied as Forslund & Krueger (1997) 
stated that the immediate benefit of job training in a struggling labor market will likely be 
smaller than in a strong labor market. Overall, Forslund & Krueger ‘s (1997) analysis implies 
that there is likely a middle-ground, optimum level of support somewhere between the Nordic 
and the Liberal approach to ALMPs. Still, keeping the insights from Forslund & Krueger’s 
(1997) analysis in mind, the Nordic construct in that instance was unsuccessful in preventing 
high levels of unemployment, so it is unreasonable to always expect large returns from ALMPs.  
A report by the UN analyzed the effectiveness of stimulus measures outside of 
unemployment benefits (United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2020). In this 
report, the UN cautions against the use of large fiscal and monetary stimulus measures to spur 
the quick recovery of equity and bond prices. Resorting to stimulus measures at the expense of 
productive investments, as the world learned from the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, will not 
be as effective (United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2020). This report also 
stated that stronger international cooperation is critical to recovery, especially to contain the 
pandemic and extend financial assistance to countries hardest hit by the crisis (United Nations 
World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2020). According to the World Economic Forum, the 
two worst-performing economies in the second quarter of 2020 were Peru and India, where GDP 
shrank by 30.2% and 23.9%, respectively (2020). With this, how can the pandemic preparedness 
of a given nation’s labor market be measured? It seems that countries which already have a 
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larger support network for workers will be more successful than those which try to hurriedly 
implement fiscal or monetary stimulus measures to support workers. 
In order to support workers, particularly in the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to 
think about the inherent disparities for low-wage workers. A paper by Escudero (2011) addressed 
this and evaluated the effectiveness of spending on ALMPs in terms of success rate in low-
skilled individuals. Ultimately, Escudero (2011) concluded that start-up incentives and the policy 
cluster were the most effective in reducing unemployment, increasing employment, and for low-
skilled workers, raising participation (Escudero, 2011). The importance of Escudero’s (2011) 
research is emphasized in a paper by Lee & Cho (2016). This paper by Lee & Cho (2016) 
referenced a previous crisis and analyzed the effects of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS) on the Korean (Asian State) labor market. One insight from this research, called the 
vulnerability approach, suggests that disasters have different effects based on both physical 
vulnerability and economic class. Under this line of thinking, low-skilled workers in Korea were 
affected more by crises (Lee & Cho 2016). Yu et al. explore this disparity further, as their 
research focuses on the section of the labor market (front-line workers) most likely to become 
infected. With this, it is important to account for income inequality in order to anticipate the 
impact that health crises like COVID-19 will have on the labor market.  
Another paper by Dingel & Neiman (2020) examined the linkages between worker 
income and the capability to continue working amidst mass lockdowns. In the U.S., they found 
that 37 percent of jobs can be performed at home. This metric was lower in lower-income 
economies. Saltiel (2020) used worker-level data from the STEP Skills Measurement Program to 
further explore the feasibility of working from home in developing nations. Only 13% of 
workers in STEP countries could work from home, with education and household wealth being 
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major contributors to its feasibility (Saltiel, 2020). The implications of this research are that more 
advanced economies may be less affected by the closure of businesses in lockdowns and may not 
need the same level of unemployment benefits or stimulus.  
This finding is also reflected in research conducted during the Ebola epidemic. Sickness 
and mortality obviously consume health care resources, but also affect the labor market by 
removing individuals either temporarily or permanently (World Bank, 2014). Aside from those 
actually affected, the virus can lead to a “fear of association with others and reduces labor force 
participation, closes places of employment, disrupts transportation, motivates some governments 
to close land borders and restrict entry of citizens from afflicted countries, and motivates private 
decision-makers to disrupt trade, travel and commerce by canceling scheduled commercial 
flights and reduction in shipping and cargo service” (World Bank, 2014). The World Bank 
estimates that in the SARS and H1N1 flu epidemics, behavioral effects are estimated to have 
caused 80-90 percent of the total economic impact. With this, it seems that confidence in one’s 
government plays a major role in epidemics/pandemics. This implies that strong democracies, 
where citizens tend to have a significant voice in policy making and governance translates to 
high confidence in the state,  have a decided advantage in crises like COVID-19. 
Looking at research that applied past epidemics to the current COVID-19 pandemic, 
McKibbin et al. (2006) estimated that the global economic cost of a Spanish Flu type pandemic 
would be close to 12.6% of GDP, with the greatest impact on non-OECD countries. In 2020, the 
same author released an update, stating that a Hong Kong Flu type pandemic would reduce 
global GDP by around $2.4 trillion USD, while a Spanish flu type outbreak could reduce global 
GDP by upwards of $9 trillion USD (McKibbin et al., 2020). This updated paper outlined the 
effects of COVID-19 on the global economy by using the SARS epidemic as a point of 
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reference. Even beyond the countries badly affected by SARS, other economies were exposed to 
these macroeconomic shocks. They find that even a contained outbreak could significantly 
impact the global economy in the short run. Ultimately, these scenarios demonstrate the large 
costs that might be avoided by greater investment in public health systems.  
Which political economies are best equipped to address crises like COVID-19? 
Given these insights, which political economies are best equipped to address crises? A 
paper by Haffajee et al. (2020) examined how COVID-19 has exposed major weaknesses in the 
United States’ federalist system of patchwork public health governance, as the constitutional 
structure rests primary responsibility for public health with the states. In a standard recession, the 
U.S. may be well equipped to quickly address issues by implementing fiscal or monetary policy, 
but COVID-19 adds an additional layer of complication. If the institutional structures, 
particularly those in healthcare, in Liberal political economies are not equipped to pass measures 
that will slow the spread of COVID-19, and ultimately, reopen the community, this could prove 
to be an advantage to the Nordic and Asian states constructs. In contrast to the Liberal U.S. 
approach, Asian states, South Korea and Taiwan, have prevented widespread community 
transmission by rapidly implementing a centralized national strategy. Both South Korea and 
Taiwan focused on disseminating consistent, reliable information in order to limit the spread of 
misinformation (Tworek, 2020). This communication was facilitated by Presidents Moon and 
Tsai, who let public health officials take center stage on advising the public on any health 
guidelines. This seems to have contributed to higher compliance rates and lower rates of 
transmission in South Korea and Taiwan. Jang et al. (2020) found that South Koreans complied 
more with health guidelines including social distancing, wearing masks, and hand washing 
during COVID-19 than the MERS crisis five years prior. This is markedly different than the 
Baldy 13 
approach taken in the U.S., where the Trump administration worked to discredit officials like Dr. 
Fauci in an effort to shore up the President’s base (Abutaleb et al., 2020). This was arguably to 
deflect blame to others amidst former President Trump’s bid for reelection. 
The U.S.’s slow initial response to COVID-19 had a swift impact on the labor market, as 
demonstrated in a study by Cajner et al. (2020) that utilized administrative payroll data from 
ADP, a U.S. payroll processing company. Although aggregate employment fell by 21 percent 
through late-April 2020, it performed slightly better by the end of June, as businesses began to 
reopen (Cajner et al., 2020). As expected, low-wage workers were disproportionately affected by 
this shock to the economy. The paper found that all of the work to save small businesses in the 
U.S. has paid off, as late April through June ‘20, saw small business employment increase by 17 
percent (Cajner et al., 2020). When compared to larger business increasing employment by 4-7 
percent during the same time period, this focus on small businesses was more effective (Cajner et 
al., 2020). The U.S. was hard-hit by COVID-19 in 2020, so it may be difficult to accurately 
predict the results of the Liberal construct that will be used to denote political economic 
structure.  
In sum, irrespective of categorization, Nordic, Liberal and Asian States countries have an 
increasingly sophisticated set of tools at their disposal that have evolved over time to address 
unemployment, whether in a financial or pandemic-induced recession. The calculus of which 
policies to pursue to address unemployment are a complex mix of economic rationality heavily 
influenced by partisanship and political ideology. This holds true whether looking at Nordic, 
Liberal or Asian State countries. Each of these papers will serve as useful references in the 




         The cross-sectional data for analysis in this research paper was compiled from several 
sources, which are shown below in Table 1.  
Table 1: 
UNBEN The proportion of previous in-work household income maintained after 6 months of 
unemployment in 2020 
NOR 
Dummy variable representing the Nordic construct, which is comprised of Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden 
LIB 
Dummy variable representing the Liberal construct, which is comprised of Canada, Ireland, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States  
ASI  
Dummy variable representing the Asian States construct, which is comprised of Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan 
GDPG 2020 Real Gross Domestic Product growth, percent change 
UNEMP 
2020 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force). Share of the labor force that is without 
work but available for and seeking employment  
INCTAX 2020 Top marginal Individual Income Tax Rates by country 
GINI 
The degree of income inequality on a scale from lowest for total equality of incomes to 
highest for total inequality of incomes. 2020 data 
DEM 
Ranked nations on a scale from 1 (Authoritarian regimes) to 10 (Full democracies). Based 
on electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture. 2020 data 
COVID Total confirmed COVID-19 cases per million in 2020 
TRUN 
A measurement of worker’s rights with respect to the degree to which unions and the rights 
of workers are protected within the country. On a scale from 1 (Sporadic violations of 
worker’s rights) to 5 (No guarantee of rights). 2020 data 
HLEXP 
Includes both regular budget allocations and allocations to extra-budgetary funds for the 
COVID-19 health response through November 2020. (in 2018 USD, adjusted to per capita) 
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The UNBEN data was collected from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Benefits and wages dataset. This indicator, “benefits in unemployment, 
share of previous income,” measures the proportion of previous in-work household income 
maintained after 6 months of unemployment. The calculations are based off of a childless, single 
person whose previous in-work earnings were 67% of the average wage. and FDI inflows data 
was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In order to examine the 
differences in spending between political economies, countries will be grouped into three binary 
dummy variables: NOR (Nordic), LIB (Liberal), and ASI (Asian States), where 1 represents that 
the country is part of that grouping, and 0 is to denote that it is not. The omitted condition will 
consist of data from randomly sampled OECD states (see Appendix A). These nations fall 
outside of the Nordic, Liberal, and Asian States constructs outlined by previous literature. The 
OECD states have been selected at random to serve as a baseline and ensure that the omitted 
condition is not correlated with NOR, LIB, or ASI. 
Looking at some of the financial metrics, the data for variable GDPG was compiled by 
the Knoema Corporation and is based on the World Economic Outlook distributed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). GDPG is the percent change in real Gross Domestic Product 
Growth. UNEMP represents the unemployment rate and was gathered via the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). And INCTAX is the top marginal individual income tax rates per country, 
which was sourced from a major accounting firm, Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG, 
2021).  
The variables, GINI, DEM, and TRUN comprise the social factors of this paper’s model.  
The GINI variable represents the degree of inequality within a nation. This statistic ranks 
countries based on an estimated Gini index, which measures the degree of income inequality 
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ranging from total equality of incomes (lowest) to total inequality of incomes (highest). The 
2020 Gini coefficient estimate was published on Statista (Statista, 2021). DEM represents the 
degree of democracy as measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit, with the index ranging 
from a full democracy (10), to an authoritarian regime (1). The EIU Democracy Index is based 
on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, 
political participation, and political culture (EIU, 2020). The variable TRUN was created using 
data from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), which measures the degree to 
which unions and the rights of workers are protected globally (ITUC, 2020). The ITUC’s Global 
Rights Index depicts the world’s worst nations for workers on a scale from 1-5 based on the 
degree of respect for workers’ rights. At a rating of 5, workers’ rights are absent, whereas at a 
level 1, violations occur on an irregular basis. 
Finally, in order to examine the links between COVID-19 and government spending, the 
variables COVID and HLEXP will be utilized. The variable COVID represents the number of 
COVID-19 cases per million in 2020. This data was provided by Our World in Data (OWID), 
which cites the confirmed cases by Johns Hopkins University (Roser et al., 2020). The variable 
HLEXP was compiled by the World Health Organization from a variety of sources including the 
IMF, OECD, European Observatory of Health Systems and Policies, among others (WHO, 
2020). The original dataset is comprised of the total government budget allocations for the 
COVID-19 health response in 2018 USD which were converted using World Bank LCU-USD 
rates. This paper adjusted this data to reflect per-capita spending in order to control for the size 
of each country. The population data used to adjust the WHO data to create HLEXP was 
obtained from the same dataset as the COVID variable, Our World in Data, which originally 
based it off of the United Nations World Population Prospects (Roser et al., 2020). 
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Below, Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the five metrics that will be analyzed 
in this section: number of observations, minimum, median, mean, maximum, and standard 
deviation. Of the sampled nations, there were some that had not yet released 2020 data, which 
can be observed in the number of observations. Many of these metrics, like UNBEN, GINI, 
TRUN, and HLEXP, had yet to be released, but these initial summary statistics still provide 
some valuable insights.  
Table 2: 
Variables UNBEN GDPG UNEMP INCTAX GINI DEM COVID TRUN HLEXP 
N 32 40 39 40 36 40 39 36 37 
Min 7.00 -12.80 2.94 10.00 24.84 5.57 33.55 1.00 0.09 
Median 60.00 -6.00 5.80 40.00 32.34 7.96 30987.70 2.00 110.45 
Mean 54.25 -6.09 6.50 37.43 31.98 7.98 30,738.80 2.19 181.00 
Max 86.00 0.00 16.85 56.95 41.78 9.81 74148.21 5.00 875.37 
Standard  
Deviation 
21.61 2.61 2.89 12.91 3.85 1.03 19,772.98 1.19 195.30 
 
Based on these initial statistics, none of the variables are particularly homogeneous other 
than DEM. Ideally, there may have been a wider sampling of more types of regimes that fall 
below the minimum of 5.57, which represents a hybrid regime, Hong Kong. However, under 
authoritarian regimes, data starts becoming less trustworthy, so the results would be unreliable. 
Moving on to the extremes, UNBEN, COVID, and HLEXP in particular had large standard 
deviations. To reiterate, UNBEN represents the percentage of retained income after 6 months, so 
the minimum of 7% versus the maximum of 86% are very stark. The minimum and maximum 
were the U.S. and Luxembourg, respectively. While it was hypothesized that the U.S., as part of 
the liberal construct, would likely spend less on unemployment benefits, 7% was still very low. 
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Seeing the current state of unemployment benefits in the U.S. sheds new light on the 
aforementioned plan set forth by the U.S Senate Committee of Finance, which aimed to offer 
100% of income for a subset of workers for 6 months. On the flipside, the Nordic countries were 
not far behind Luxembourg’s generosity, with Denmark offering 82% of wage replacement and 
the rest of the Nordics leading the pack above the average of 54.25%.  
As for the COVID metric, the stark differences in case numbers between nations 
demonstrate the disparate impacts of the pandemic. The maximum of 74148.21 and minimum of 
33.55 cases per million were Luxembourg and Taiwan, respectively. The standard deviation of 
19,772.98 further demonstrates the impact of COVID-19 This will serve as a useful metric in 
investigating how each construct was affected, and if there were linkages between the spread of 
COVID-19 and political economic structure.  
Looking at HLEXP, it is surprising to see how minor health spending was in South Korea 
in 2020. However, South Korea also had a fairly low number of COVID-19 cases, at 1204.80, so 
perhaps the countries which were more affected like the U.S. (which was the maximum of 
$875.37 per capita) needed to allocate more emergency funding for the COVID-19 health 
response. In general, this was true of all the Liberal states, as Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, and 
the UK each spent more than the average $181 per capita. 
To reiterate, there were some gaps in this data given that it was collected in early 2021, 
before some nations had reported 2020 data. Unfortunately, fewer observations could be made 
based on the Asian States construct, as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan in particular, had not 
yet reported 2020 data in several instances. In the next section, the theoretical framework will be 




Referencing previous research on political economic structures’ varying approaches to 
accomplishing policy objectives, the following theoretical model has been constructed in order to 
measure the impact of political economic structure on unemployment benefits. The COVID-19 
pandemic has already had an adverse effect worldwide, and this model will seek to measure the 
impact that these economic and social measures will have on unemployment benefits and the 
broader labor market. 
The regression used the following theoretical model: UNBEN=β0 + β1 (GDPG)+ β2 (UNEMP) + 
β3 (INCTAX) + β4 (GINI) + β5 (DEM) + β6 (COVID) + β7 (TRUN) + β8 (HLEXP)+ γ1𝑑i (NOR) 
+ γ2𝑑i (LIB) + γ3𝑑i (ASI) +  ε 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many nations have opted to implement stimulus 
measures in order to offset rising unemployment rates and mass lockdowns. However, in order to 
look at the variance in approaches to labor market spending by different political economic 
structures, unemployment benefits will be used. A nation that already has comprehensive 
unemployment benefits in place is unlikely to need stimulus measures. In order to measure 
unemployment benefits, OECD data on the variable unemployment benefits measured as a share 
of previous income will be utilized. The significance of the unemployment benefits replacement 
rate was detailed in Esping Andersen’s (1990) paper on Welfare Capitalism. This approach was 
utilized by Ganong et al. (2020) to look at the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. 
Another paper by Van Vliet & Caminada (2012), also examined unemployment replacement 
rates among 34 welfare states. The unemployment benefit replacement rates will provide insight 

















The predicted relationships between UNBEN and each respective independent variable 
are above in Table 3. Each explanatory variable will provide valuable insights to both UNBEN 
as well each of the dummy variable groupings NOR, LIB, and ASI. Again, each construct in this 
paper has a different approach to welfare and unemployment benefits. Therefore, the 
expectations for each explanatory variable are different for each construct. 
To recap, the Nordic construct is characterized by high taxes, significant amounts of 
income redistribution, and a high level of confidence and trust in the state (Andersen et. al, 
2007). The Liberal construct tends to be market-oriented, with a lower level of expenditure on 
social protection and a higher level of income inequality when compared to the Nordic construct, 
yet still spends a fair amount on social expenditures (Spicker, 2013). Finally, the Asian states 
construct is characterized as an emerging welfare state, with an emphasis on welfare programs 
for economic development, and an inclination towards health and education over social security 
(Park & Jung, 2007). It is anticipated that NOR and the LIB, respectively the Nordic and Liberal 
constructs, will each spend more on unemployment benefits relative to ASI, hence the negative 
predicted sign. Park & Jung (2007) stated that Asian states tend to spend less on unemployment 
benefits in favor of health and education. However, it is expected that the Nordic construct, 
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characterized by high taxes and significant amounts of income redistribution, will have a 
stronger positive correlation with UNBEN than the liberal construct (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
GDPG will measure the percent change in real Gross Domestic Product Growth. The 
predicted sign for GDPG and UNBEN is positive, as it is expected that a nation experiencing 
growth in its economy will spend more on unemployment benefits. Public expenditure on 
unemployment benefits generates an input to growth that is increased by a multiplier effect. 
Looking at the U.S., Gravelle et al.’s (2008) report estimated this effect as a $1 increase in 
unemployment benefits generating an estimated $1.64 in near-term GDP. However, these 
calculations vary based on methodology, as a 2010 estimate by the US Congressional Budget 
Office found that increasing unemployment benefits by $1 increased GDP by between $0.7 and 
$1.9 from 2010-2015. Across each of the state constructs, NOR, LIB, and ASI, it is anticipated 
that wealthier countries with a stronger economy will spend more on social programs. 
The variable UNEMP measures the unemployment rate. The relationship between 
unemployment benefits and the unemployment rate is difficult to predict, as heightened 
unemployment is multicausal. A country that is more prone to a high unemployment rate through 
other factors may choose to support workers with higher replacement rate unemployment 
benefits. However, research by Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1985) suggests that at least 
part of the link between unemployment benefit levels and the unemployment rate is causal. 
Another article by Nickell (1997) states that passive unemployment benefit systems influence 
unemployment by reducing the fear of unemployment, which directly increases upward pressure 
on wages from employees. Passive unemployment benefit systems also allow workers to be more 
selective in new employment opportunities (Nickell, 1997, p. 67). In periods of relative 
economic prosperity, Nordic countries provide more relief to unemployed workers, so countries 
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like Sweden or Finland tend to have higher unemployment rates than Liberal or Asian states 
(Logue, 2019). However, given the widespread lockdowns enacted globally, it is anticipated that 
2020 unemployment data will be less affected by nation grouping.  
INCTAX represents the top marginal individual income tax rates per country. The 
predicted sign for INCTAX is positive, as a nation which has higher taxes is expected to fund 
more comprehensive social programs and as a result, will spend more on unemployment benefits 
and active labor market policies. A paper by Boix (2001) investigated how economic 
development and certain political institutions lead to growth of the public sector and includes a 
discussion on how the taxes which fund the public sector are set (p.2). He posits that the state 
intervenes to provide certain collective goods including infrastructure, which is followed by 
industrialization and an aging population. This then leads to increased demand for 
unemployment benefits, health insurance, and pensions (Boix, 2001). Lindert (2004) also makes 
this linkage between income taxes and social spending in the form of unemployment benefits. 
Again, it is predicted that the NOR countries will have higher income taxes, as there is a 
propensity to use tax revenues to redistribute wealth in the form of other benefits. Relative to 
NOR, LIB and ASI nations will have lower income taxes (Asen, 2020). 
The GINI variable represents the degree of inequality within a nation. This statistic ranks 
countries based on an estimated Gini index, which measures the degree of income inequality on a 
scale from the total equality of incomes (lowest), or total inequality of incomes (highest). The 
expected sign for GINI is negative, as the higher the coefficient, the more inequality present, 
meaning that it is likely that the government would spend less on unemployment benefits. A 
paper by Aaberge et al. (2000) investigated the link between income inequality and 
unemployment benefits. They hypothesized that an increase in unemployment benefits will 
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counteract more unequally distributed earnings. Aaberge et al. (2000) found that unemployment 
benefits and income inequality are negatively correlated, as there was evidence of some 
mitigating effects (p. 95). Again, as some of the main objectives of Nordic countries are to 
redistribute wealth and create equality, it is anticipated that the NOR construct will have lower 
GINI values than LIB or ASI.  
DEM represents the degree of democracy as measured by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, with the index ranging from a full democracy (10) to an authoritarian regime (1). The 
expected sign for DEM is positive, as it is expected that a democratic regime would be inclined 
to spend more on unemployment benefits. A paper by Orenstein (2008) stated that the top fifteen 
developing country welfare states that opted to maintain a relatively high level of social 
protection were well-functioning democracies. This level of benefit generosity in the West is 
juxtaposed by the labor-cost pressure that is diverting foreign direct investment further east 
(Orenstein, 2008, p.91). Again, this is supported by Boix’s (2001) paper, where he states that 
regime type is a critical factor. In democratic regimes, politicians are more subject to the whims 
of voters, so the public sector grows parallel to the structural changes associated with economic 
development, whereas in authoritarian countries, the public sector remains small (Boix, 2001, 
p.2). For DEM, it is expected that Nordic countries will have the highest level of democracy as 
measured through transparent electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, etc., followed by Liberal nations, and then Asian states. 
The variable COVID represents the number of COVID-19 cases per million in 2020. The 
expected sign is positive, as it is expected that a harder hit country will spend more on 
unemployment benefits in 2020 to offset the adverse economic effects of the pandemic. For 
example, the U.S., which was one of the hardest-hit countries, implemented the CARES Act. 
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This also created the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, which added $600 in 
weekly unemployment benefits (Rothwell 2020). In Nordic countries, which tend to have 
stronger healthcare infrastructure and better health outcomes, it is anticipated that there will be 
lower case numbers than a Liberal nation (Einhorn, 2019).  
For TRUN, the expected sign is negative. This variable was created using data from the 
International Trade Union Confederation, which measures the degree to which unions and the 
rights of workers are protected globally. Since a 1 on the Global Rights Index represents the best 
countries for workers, it is anticipated that there will be a negative correlation between TRUN 
and UNBEN. As referenced above, the article by Nickell (1997) found that pressure from unions 
led to an increase in worker wages and unemployment benefits. A paper by Gordon (2014) 
analyzed cross-national data on unemployment benefit generosity and active labor market policy 
from 1985 to 2005. While the true impact of trade unions has been questioned in recent years, 
Gordon (2014) argues that variations in unionism are the main factor in unemployment 
protection spending differences in wealthy democracies. His central argument is supported by 
union density, union centralization, and relative involvement in unemployment benefit 
administration (Gordon, 2014). Again, it seems that Nordic countries will have low ITUC global 
index scores given their emphasis on supporting workers, followed by Liberal and then Asian 
states, which will be more market-focused. Previous research by Logue (2019) attributed the 
difference in trade unions between Nordic and Liberal states to a decline in union density in the 
U.S. and UK. This divergence was initiated by anti-union policies implemented by the Reagan 
and Thatcher administrations, coupled with increased Nordic unionization. 
HLEXP represents health expenditures per capita for each nation. The predicted sign for 
HLEXP is positive. A country that spends more on health expenditures per person would likely 
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also spend more on unemployment benefits. As stated above in Boix (2001), the public sector 
has a tendency to expand as the older cohort of the population expands, as citizens begin to 
demand inter-generational transfers in the form of health care programs, along with 
unemployment benefits (p.5). As referenced above in the COVID section, Nordic nations tend to 
spend more on healthcare, so while it is expected that spending will be fairly high in 2020, 
Liberal states will likely have higher HLEXP in 2020 to supplement normal healthcare 
expenditures to combat COVID-19. The section that follows presents the results of the linear 


















The estimation results of the baseline model, which was presented in the preceding 
section, are in Table 4, under Model 1. To reiterate, the predicted relationships between UNBEN 
were GDPG(+), UNEMP(+), INCTAX(+), GINI(-), DEM(+), COVID(+), TRUN(-), HLEXP(+), 






In order to analyze different political economic structures’ approaches to unemployment 
benefits in a global pandemic, Model 1 utilized 2020 cross-national data. Looking at the results, 
the R2 is .6389, which means that this specification explains 63.89% of the variation in the data. 
But this high R2 seems to be due to the number of explanatory variables rather than a true good 
fit, as the adjusted R2 for Model 1 is .3906, which is fairly low. However, this was not 
necessarily unexpected, as in cross-national data, lower R2s are more common given the large 
variation in the size of each country. But still, the impact of the explanatory variables on 
UNBEN will also help explain the fit of the model. Looking at the explanatory variables used in 
Model 1, only TRUN is significant at the 0.1 level (designated by an asterisk). Based on the 
correlation coefficient of -10.1742, for every one-unit decrease in the TRUN coefficient, there 
will be a 10.1742% increase in the wage replacement rate provided by unemployment benefits. 
This was in line with expectations, as based on the referenced literature, it was hypothesized that 
TRUN would be negatively correlated with UNBEN, since the lower the TRUN score, the better 
the degree of protection is for workers and unions in a given country.  
Given these largely insignificant results, five different specifications of the model were 
tested. Since the data is cross-sectional, the number of observations is fairly low, so it seemed 
that eleven explanatory variables may be too many to see real results. In order to remove 
variables, rather than just basing it off of significance, the theory and literature behind each 
variable were referenced. Since the literature behind TRUN and HLEXP was not necessarily as 
strongly and historically backed as the others, Models 2-5 included neither of these variables. In 
Model 2, the adjusted R2 decreased from the initial result of .3906 for Model 1 to .3664. As far as 
significant variables, LIB was significant at the 0.01 level. The correlation coefficient of LIB 
was -49.5660. This can be interpreted as: if a country is in the liberal construct, on average, it’s 
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unemployment benefits will be 49.5660% lower than a nation belonging to the rest of the 
sampled nations (Nordic, Asian states, and the omitted condition of OECD states). This was not 
necessarily in line with initial expectations. Although social spending is generally lower in 
Liberal political economic structures than the level seen in Nordic nations, it was expected that 
LIB would still have a slight positive correlation. However, this was not entirely unexpected, 
given the more market-based approach that Liberal nations tend to use.  
For the final three models, each dummy variable (NOR, LIB, ASI), denoting political 
economic structure, was isolated. Model 3 only included NOR, whereas Model 4 only included 
LIB, and Model 5 only included ASI. Of these three models, Model 4 had the highest adjusted R2 
and the most significant explanatory variables. The adjusted R2 for Model 4 was .4150. LIB and 
INCTAX were both significant at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Similar to model 2, LIB 
had a strong negative correlation in Model 4, whereas INCTAX had a positive correlation with 
UNBEN. The correlation coefficient of .6046 for INCTAX was in line with initial expectations, 
as it was hypothesized that INCTAX would be positively correlated with UNBEN, given that 
nations which implement higher taxes will likely redistribute these revenues into areas like 
unemployment benefits (Asen, 2020). Based on the correlation coefficient of 0.6046, for every 
one-unit decrease in the INCTAX coefficient, there will be a 0.6046% increase in the wage 
replacement rate provided by unemployment benefits. 
The F-statistic is another indicator to measure the strength of the relationship. Comparing 
each of the models, the F-statistic was significant based on the varying degrees of freedom in 
Models 1, 2, and 4. Model 4 had the highest F-statistic of 4.1418, which was significant at the 
0.01 level. Finally, looking at the Residual Standard Error (RSE) for each of the different 
models, it was the lowest for Model 4 at 16.5210, with Model 1’s RSE of 16.9997 being the 
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second smallest. To interpret the Residual Standard Error, the fit of Model 4 is the best, as the 
RSE is the standard deviation of the residuals, so a smaller RSE is preferred.  
Considering the broader implications of these results, they were entirely in line with the 
expectations set forth in the theory section. The Nordic political economic structure has a 
demonstrated tendency towards higher social spending and income redistribution, so the 
expectation was for NOR to be significant with a strong correlation. As for the Asian states 
construct, there is less literature given that the Asian welfare state is fairly new. In addition to 
this, there was a limited amount of 2020 data available for Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
in particular. Although it was hoped that a significant result would be obtained, the insignificant 
results for this construct are unsurprising, given the lack of data.  
Finally, the Liberal construct was significant, despite there being an expected positive 
correlation, with the results showing a strong negative correlation between UNBEN and LIB. 
However, this was not entirely unexpected, as it was initially predicted that the liberal construct 
would have a weaker positive correlation since most of the literature ranked its level of social 
spending behind Nordic states. While the literature and theory seemed to back the initial 
prediction, the data analysis section was an early indicator of this possible outcome. As a whole, 
the Liberal states all spent less than the average UNBEN metric. The U.S.’ spending was 
particularly low, as it provided less than ten percent of a worker’s income 6 months into 
unemployment. While not as low as the U.S., each of the other Liberal nations were far below 
the UNBEN average.  
This raises the question: why do Liberal nations spend less on unemployment benefits? 
To reference the U.S., at the state level, there is a reluctance to raise taxes from employers, so 
many states opt to cut benefits (Porter, 2021). This could be due to political pressure from voters. 
Baldy 30 
In addition, the variable UNBEN may capture a snapshot of the data, but it does not necessarily 
show the bigger picture of labor market spending, which will be elaborated on in the conclusion. 
However, moving forward, this has broad implications for Liberal nations. Particularly in the 
U.S., the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed disparities in the labor market for low-income 
workers. This may prove to be a turning point as policymakers are forced to accede to demands 
to provide more support for workers in the form of enhanced unemployment benefits. 
Econometric Tests 
Model 1 had a lack of significant variables, so to rectify this error, Model 4 omitted 
TRUN and HLEXP. Although these TRUN was significant in Model 1, these variables seemed 
to have the least theory and literature to support their inclusion with so few observations. The fit 
of Model 4 was slightly better, as evidenced by the criteria in the Results section. Given that the 
data is cross-sectional, this part of the paper tested for heteroskedasticity, specification error, and 
multicollinearity. The results are presented below.  
The biggest concern with cross-sectional data is heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity 
violates the Ordinary Least Squares’ (OLS) classical assumption that the observations of the 
error term are drawn from a distribution with constant variance (Studenmund, 2016). Especially 
given the large variation in the population sizes of countries analyzed in this paper. Initially, to 
avoid spurious correlation, all of the data was adjusted into per capita metrics to control for size. 
But still, given the factor of COVID-19, this could have affected smaller nations in unexpected 
ways. The Breusch-Pagan test was utilized to test for heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis is 






The results of the Breusch-Pagan test for Model 4 are above in Figure 1. Given that there 
are 7 degrees of freedom, the critical Chi-Square value of 14.07, coupled with the p-value of 
0.215, tells us that at the 0.05 level, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity.  
Next, in order to check that Model 4 is indeed the best specification, the Ramsey RESET 
test was used. Ramsey RESET tests for specification error in linear regression models. It can tell 
us if non-linear combinations might better explain the response variable. If non-linear 
combinations of the explanatory variables have any power in explaining the response variable, 
the model is misspecified and the data may be better suited to another form. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no specification error. In Figure 2, the output for the Ramsey RESET test result 
for Model 4 is shown. 
Figure 2: 
 
For the RESET test of Model 4, the p-value is 0.6127, meaning that there is not enough 
evidence to reject the null at the 5% confidence level. It can be concluded that there is no 
evidence of specification error in Model 4.  
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Finally, in order to test for multicollinearity, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was 
used. VIF testing is a method to detect the severity of multicollinearity by measuring the degree 
to which an explanatory variable can be explained by the rest of the explanatory variables. It is 
an index of how much multicollinearity has increased the variance of a coefficient in the model. 
The results are below in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: 
 
A high VIF above the absolute value of 5 indicates that there is a collinearity problem. In 
Model 4, there was no evidence of multicollinearity in any of the explanatory variables. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no evidence of a multicollinearity problem to 
consider in Model 4.  
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to analyze the differences in labor market spending based 
on a state’s political economic structure. Looking at the results of the theorized model, the 
Liberal construct (LIB) and top marginal individual income tax rates (INCTAX) were significant 
in the preferred specification, Model 4. No other variables were significant. This raises the 
question of whether or not the remaining variables, NOR, ASI, GDPG, UNEMP, GINI, DEM, 
and COVID, in Model 4 are relevant variables. While these variables are not necessarily 
statistically significant, the theory behind their inclusion is solid, as evidenced by the references 
in the theory section and literature review, particularly Nelson (2012), Esping-Andersen (1990), 
and Boix (2001). Given these compelling arguments, the final specification of the model 
includes these variables, as removing them may cause omitted variable bias. 
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The data collection process for this paper proved to be very difficult, as 2020 data was 
needed to analyze labor market spending during COVID-19. Available data was often limited to 
Western nations, which made locating data for the Asian States construct particularly difficult. In 
this sense, time was a significant limitation, as ideally, the data collection process could have 
been extended well into 2021 and beyond to locate the best data possible on each country. As 
referenced in the results section, one major choice that had to be made was how to measure labor 
market spending with respect to COVID-19. The international response to the crisis was so 
varied that it would be impossible to find just one variable to represent unemployment benefits. 
For example, some countries sent out stimulus checks, some extended unemployment benefits, 
etc., with many implementing a unique combination of policies. Ultimately, using the 
unemployment benefits wage replacement rate seemed to be the best option, as emergency 
stimulus measures are not necessary if a given country already has a sufficient safety net in place 
for workers. However, a future improvement could be to use the change in unemployment 
benefits from 2019-2020 as the dependent variable. This would further clarify whether or not 
countries with weak safety nets needed to boost unemployment benefits more in the COVID-19 
pandemic compared to countries with strong safety nets. 
Undertaking this study did provide several helpful insights and valuable experiences. 
Considering that COVID-19 has continued to evolve over the course of this venture, real-time 
adjustments needed to be made in order to build the best model possible under the time 
constraints. This was both challenging and rewarding. COVID-19 still poses great uncertainty for 
policymakers around the world, and as their responses evolve, this research is only meant to 
represent one side of a multifaceted and complex problem. As more data becomes available, 
future research will be able to measure the impact of political economic structure on labor 
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market spending during COVID-19 more accurately. And as the global population is vaccinated, 
the labor market and broader economy will rebound while COVID-19 fades into the background. 
Undoubtedly, the threat of pandemics will continue in our lifetimes, so future research 
opportunities will be critical to ensuring policy responses are proactive and appropriately 
targeted. As the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt said in 2007: 
“Everything we do before a pandemic will seem alarmist, everything we do after a pandemic will 
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